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Languages and Loyalties: Shaping Identity in Tunisia  






 Group memberships can, of course, be important (no serious theory of persons or  
 individuals can ignore those social relationships), but the diminution of human beings  
 involved in taking note only of one membership category for each person (neglecting all  
 others) expunges at one stroke the far-reaching relevance of our manifold affinities and  
 involvements. 




The 16th-century Spanish grammarian Antonio de Nebrija once said that ―language has always 
been the companion of empire.‖i Colonial empires of past centuries indeed produced language 
practices that influence speaking habits today. However, as the world becomes increasingly 
entrenched in the processes of globalization, global interactions are amplified. When discussing 
the place of language in globalization, it is therefore valuable to acknowledge colonial legacies 
while looking at the implications of a more recently significant phenomenon: international 
migration. Given the power of national governments to shape national identities, the contexts of 
colonization and immigration raise interesting questions about how government policies 
influence the connotations of languages. While the policies imposed by colonial regimes and 
those enacted today in response to immigration are not identical, both offer opportunities to 
investigate how language policies may affect individual identities. 
   The ―Globalization in Comparative Perspective‖ year abroad, sponsored by the Macalester 
College Institute for Global Citizenship, was a prime opportunity to study the role of language in 
the globalizing world. Peter Singer writes of globalization: ―Over the past few centuries the 
isolation has dwindled. Slowly at first, then with increasing rapidity. Now people living on 
opposite sides of the world are linked in ways previously unimaginable.‖ii I use two case studies 
to exemplify how increasing global interaction compels governments and citizens to re-examine 
identities that were, perhaps, previously less challenged. My fall semester in Tunisia offers 
insight into the lasting effects of mixing a history of French colonization with the cultural 
legacies of an Arab state. My spring semester in the Netherlands, alternatively, facilitated a study 
of the ways immigration may generate an urge to protect an identity that was once taken as a 
given. Both locations have experienced encounters between different cultures, with different 
languages. The more I observed language dynamics in these locations, the more the rationales 
behind the choices fascinated me. Amartya Sen’s arguments influence my conviction that 
language as a medium of identity requires a multi-faceted analysis. Sen acknowledges the 
society-wide effects that designations of identity generate, but he also emphasizes the role of 
personal choice in their expression. Inspired by Sen’s claim that a person faced with plural 
identities prioritizes them based on political and social circumstances, this study asks: In what 
ways do government language policies influence how an individual evaluates the significance of 
his or her concurrent identities? 
    To address this question, section two outlines the theoretical connections between language 
and identity established in the existing academic literature. I connect the literature to Sen’s work 
articulated in his volume, Identity and Violence. While existing literature covers these topics, 
discussion is lacking about the potential for government policies to shape the relationships 
between language and identity. Section two also addresses language planning. Section three 
seeks to illustrate the relationships between language, identity, and political planning through 
two case studies. The Tunisia study focuses on French and Arabic code-switching (the habitual 
switching between languages) as a potential consequence of colonial and post-colonial language 
policies. I incorporate personal interviews conducted with Tunisian women. Next, the study of 
the Netherlands addresses the essay’s central question focusing on the Dutch Civic Integration 
Examination, a requirement for Dutch citizenship since 2006. The views of a Dutch official in 
the field of immigration issues add to the research. Section four offers conclusions and suggests 
avenues for future research. 
 
II. Theoretical Framework 
 
In this section, I reflect upon language as a medium of identity, envisaging identity as an 
expression of loyalty to a certain set of norms and values, cultural and political. The ideology 
underlying language includes, according to Woolard and Schieffelin, ―the cultural system of 
ideas about social and linguistic relationships, together with their loading of moral and political 
interests.‖iii The assumption of connections between language and identity underlies the 
following considerations: first of Sen and identity, and second of government language policies. 
 
A. Language and Identity 
 
Multilingual situations engender a hyperconsciousness about speaking habits, Madeleine Dobie 
argues in an analysis of linguistic diversity.
iv
 In the quote presented at the beginning of this 
essay, Sen states that strict cultural categorization neglects the existence of complex individual 
identities.
v
 He argues against ―the illusion of singularity,‖ or the presumption that people can be 
easily classified, which creates tension in a non-homogenous society.
vi
 Based on Dobie and 
Sen’s assertions, the cultural encounters resulting from colonialism and immigration should have 
the potential to cause reassessments of language habits. An encounter between cultures that 
speak different languages is a potential impetus to delineate a language for a community, 
Woolard and Schieffelin argue accordingly.
vii
 
   The more emotional aspects of these encounters are avoided in the arguments of Dobie, 
Woolard and Schieffelin, but Sen addresses them through his book’s focus on the anxiety caused 
by navigating numerous identities. Sen constructs his arguments in opposition to those of Samuel 
Huntington’s 1993 ―Clash of Civilizations‖ hypothesis.  Everyone belongs to distinct, 
incompatible civilizations defined by factors such as history, language, culture, and religion, 
according to Huntington.
viii
 Unlike Sen’s emphasis on the multitudes that exist within any 
individual, Huntington believes that those belonging to one society share a homogenous 
identity.
ix
 Speaking a language would therefore be a declaration of belonging to a specific group. 
For this essay I subscribe to Sen over Huntington and regard the connections between language 
and identity as flexible. However, Sen does make a pertinent qualification: individual choices 
occur within sociopolitical constraints that limit their feasibility.
x
 
    The adoption of languages (or semi-adoption in the case of language mixing) could indicate 
openness to their ideological implications, Urciuoli argues in her work ―Language and Borders,‖ 
in which she underscores the fluidity of identity and its susceptibility to being influenced.
xi
 
Nevertheless, Urciuoli recognizes the constraints described by Sen and claims that switching 
fully between languages is more likely to occur when identity is politicized and compromise is 
less acceptable.
xii
 Colonization and immigration are ripe for politicization. Constraints on choice 
and the politicization of language are central to the analyses of Tunisia and the Netherlands. 
Unlike Huntington’s perspective, this article takes the connections between language and identity 
as social and political constructs. Politics hinge on perceptions of a society’s identities and 
subsequent priorities. Constraints could therefore include perceptions of identity that discount 
individual divergences and encourage prioritization based on what society at large values most. 
One language may not be abandoned in favor of another, but their uses could become 
differentiated, Sen claims.
xiii
 My studies of Tunisia and the Netherlands explore the pressure 
individuals face from competing expressions and perceptions of loyalties. 
   The navigation of loyalties involves deeply-rooted cultural and personal attitudes that affect 
speaking habits, according to Dobie.
xiv
 Because of these considerations, switching between 
languages is psychologically taxing, according to Ennaji in her discussion of multilingualism.
xv
 
Speakers may experience frustrated attempts to match certain images. Multilingual situations 
generate tension when the multiple identities cannot be expressed simultaneously. The pressure 
to prioritize is less in the case of non-contrasting identities, Sen argues in a qualification of Moha 
Ennaji’s claims.xvi He writes that ―a person has to make choices—explicitly or by implication—
about what importance to attach, in a particular context, to the divergent loyalties and priorities 
that may compete for precedence.‖xvii Similarly, Urciuoli argues that publicly using more than 
one language, like the code-switching I study in Tunisia, is more likely when no clear language 




B. Language Planning  
 
An understanding of the construction of language connotations is key as I examine the reasoning 
behind, and effects of, government language planning. Sociologist Pierre Bourdieu contends that 
language is a form of symbolic manipulation, ―which aims at determining the (mental) 
representation that other people may form of these properties and their bearers.‖xix His statement 
further establishes that language is a means to shape identity. Bourdieu would agree that 
language planning is a method used by those in power to shape the representations people hold 
of themselves and others. Bourdieu’s ideas complement those of Sen and provide solid roots 
from which to approach language planning. Both case studies suit an assessment of the political 
strength of language and my study of Tunisia pays particular attention to the influence of 
educational systems. Government officials are often the people powerful enough to assign roles 
and meanings to languages.
xx
 It is important to keep in mind, though, that my focus on the 
political aspects of language does not contradict Sen’s emphasis on the role of individual choice; 
Sen recognizes that these choices are made within the limits of what has been framed as 
acceptable. 
   Language planning conveys the acceptable uses of languages by constructing a linguistic 
hierarchy. Post-colonial states in particular tend to promote certain languages as they organize 
their societies around projects that relate cultural identity to economic and political development, 
according to Ronald Judy in his analysis of language in Tunisia.
xxi
 Judy limits his analysis to the 
 post-colonial context, but states like the Netherlands, facing large amounts of immigration, may 
be tempted to construct similar connections. Many states have identified national languages, 
distinguishing one or more languages as the most acceptable expression of belonging. Some 
countries, like the Netherlands, have gone further and made knowledge of the national language 
obligatory for citizenship and residence; this trend is expanding, with countries like Canada also 
considering language proficiency requirements.
xxii
 McNamara and Shohamy argue that 
―Governments and other central authorities use tests to impose educational policies knowing that 
those who are affected by the tests will change their behavior.‖xxiii Even countries that have 
historically encouraged immigration, like the United States and Australia, have tightened 
language requirements, motivated by discussions of national identity that have been spurred by 
intensified globalization.
xxiv
 The assumption that language equals culture lies in the political 
contexts of colonialism, post-colonialism, and immigration. Whether this assumption is correct is 
less important than the fact that the perpetuation of such connections through language planning 
may make it the reality. As top-down language planning changes over time, so could perceptions 
of self. Despite the established research on the connections between language and identity 
discussed here, it is useful to use Sen—whose ideas underpin the other authors’ arguments—to 
structure a more thorough examination of the effects of globalization and identity. Applying the 
theories to Tunisia and the Netherlands illustrates how language policies signify efforts to define 
a national identity and place constraints on individual choice.  
 
III. Case Studies 
 
I use two cases to examine the constraining influence of government language policies on the 
prioritization of identities. First, I examine how language policies have shaped speaking habits 
and identity in Tunisia at the level of the individual. Second, for the Netherlands, I illustrate the 
government’s methods and motivations to construct and maintain a national identity through 
language. Colonization in the mid-20th century and migration at the beginning of the 21st 
century are not synonymous. Nevertheless, both situations imply that cultural and lingual 
confrontations spur an evaluation of identity. I believe the comparison demonstrates the potential 
effects on identity that accompany increasing global interaction. 
 
A. Tunisia: Colonization and Code-Switching  
 
French is not in competition with Arabic. Their functions are different: Arabic is the 
 official language; French, language of the window to the world, is not an attack but one 
 of our cards. 




Situated on the North African coast, Tunisia has seen numerous foreign occupants. A possession 
that passed between Roman, Arab, Ottoman, and French hands, it is a valuable location to study 
the political and social effects of language. The languages involved in my study are Arabic and 
French. Three varieties of Arabic exist in Tunisia. First is Classical Arabic, irrevocably 
associated with Islam but fluently grasped by few.
xxvi
 Second is Modern Standard Arabic, linked 
with the mid-20th century attempt to spread a sense of universal culture in the Arab world. Its 
original aim in the Maghreb was to replace French as a medium of expressing modernity.
xxvii
 
Today it is seen as easier and more useful than Classical Arabic but it is a learned, not mother, 
 tongue.
xxviii
 Finally, there are Arabic dialects, which are unique to each Arab country and usually 
spoken as the mother tongue. This essay refers most often to the third category. A significant 
portion of the dialectal Arabic vocabulary in Tunisia is borrowed or adapted from French. 
Nonetheless, French holds its own status in Tunisia and French media still outsells Arabic media 
53 years after France’s formal exit.xxix 
   I first establish the colonial role of language in Tunisia and then outline the post-independence 
policies. I engage Sen’s theories of identity throughout, supported by interviews I conducted 
with two Tunisian women who switch regularly between French and Arabic and have lived 
under both the French protectorate and the Tunisian republic. The women include retired 
professor Sonya and international translator Yasmine, both in their sixties. (Their names have 
been changed to protect their privacy.) The women share a high level of education, implying 
exposure to a variety of worldviews. The final criterion is location; both women live in suburban 
Tunis, an area that experienced a significant French presence. These criteria are valuable because 
my research question assumes that these women can make choices between languages. The more 
languages and worldviews to which they were exposed, the more likely it is that their code-
switching indicates choices. Current forms of globalization, like large-scale international 
migration, have replaced colonization as a force through which speakers of different languages 
come into contact, but the research about the colonial period aspires to establish a historical 
precedent. 
 
1. Colonial Tunisia 
 
To characterize the 75-year period of French control in Tunisia as one of political dominance 
would be too limited a description. During the creation of the French protectorate in 1881, 
language was a powerful weapon in the colonial arsenal and a method of oppression as effective 
as physical force, argues Jerad, a scholar at the Center for Maghreb Studies in Tunis.
xxx
 The 
inundation of French into a society that had previously been 100 percent Arabic speaking put 
into sharp relief the connotations attached to speaking a language. Establishing power in Tunisia 
was a mission civilisatrice for the French, one in which they sought to establish their culture as 
superior to the pre-existing local cultures.
xxxi
 The French goals were largely cultural, not 
economic, in nature.
xxxii
 Arabic and consequently its speakers were classified as belonging to an 
inferior society and a backward way of life. Colonization, therefore, constrained identity because 
each language conveyed an opposing identity. The French reproduced the separation through 
power structures within which one had to work if he or she desired to prosper socially, 
economically, or politically. 
   The pressing issue is this: how did French shift from being the language of the intruder to 
being integrated into everyday speech and interaction? The colonial administration’s language 
planning exemplifies the manner in which language and ideology are conflated and perpetuated. 
The chosen status of French had ideological motivations but also practical consequences.
xxxiii
 
The administration implemented the language as that of government, business, and secular 
education.
xxxiv
 Arabic speakers were compelled to acquire a command of French for political, 
economic, or social mobility, and the high status that accompanied the mobility consequently 
elevated the perception of French. Except for those in the southern desert regions, where the 
colonial grasp was light, Arabic’s use narrowed to the home and religion. 
   In my interviews with Sonya and Yasmine, they spoke of the roles Arabic and French held in 
their upbringings. When asked what effect French has had on her life, Sonya reflected: ―I have 
 always spoken French, so I do not know… But I belong to the older generation and for us Arabic 
was not very important. I learned Arabic in secondary school. I spoke a mixture at home.‖xxxv 
Her response demonstrates the depth of the French influence for Sonya’s generation. It is 
intriguing, however, to consider how others viewed the French speakers. Yasmine’s response is 
illuminating: ―We did not speak French at home. [But] this did not create any kind of 
estrangement. My speaking French was alright with my parents, they did not feel like we were 
getting away from their culture. I went to a school that taught in both, which was more than other 
people in my generation who spoke mostly in French.‖xxxvi Despite their different educational 
experiences and home environments, the French language played a significant role in each of 
their young lives. Although Yasmine did not speak French at home, the language was 
nevertheless accepted by her family as a necessity. I will next explore how these early 
experiences affect the current associations the women make between language and identity. 
 
2. Post-Colonial Tunisia 
 
After Habib Bourguiba became the first president of independent Tunisia in 1956, lingual and 
cultural ties to France persisted. Initially, Bourguiba favored Arabization—or the elevation of 
Arabic to the sole language of the government and education. Soon, however, he publicly 
favored French language and culture, according to Craig Sirles.
xxxvii
 Indeed, an American 
diplomat reported in 1972 that he had ―never met a man outside of France so French and in the 
Arab world so little Arab‖ until he met Tunisia’s first president.xxxviii Bourguiba sought to create 
a modernized state and stressed multiculturalism and ties to the West through language.
xxxix
 
Arabic defaulted to the language of tradition and the private sphere despite its new status as 
Tunisia’s official language. Through his policies, Bourguiba encouraged a greater consciousness 
about language and the perception that speaking French was synonymous with a modern identity 
and high status. Arabization was meant to produce ―an Arabic modernity as well as an integral 
national linguistic space of cultural authenticity,‖ according to Judy.xl Nevertheless, French was 
too deeply ingrained to be replaced. 
   An absence of Arabic infrastructure, especially in education, stunted Arabization in Tunisia, 
reflecting the government’s lack of enthusiasm for the process. The government and elite were 
nearly all French-educated and the majority of Tunisians lived close to the most francophone 
areas of the country, including the northern coasts and especially the capital of Tunis. Tunisian 
literacy rates in Arabic and French at this time were roughly equal among the general population, 
suggesting that a complete eradication of French could have been problematic.
xli
 Sonya and 
Yasmine both emphasized the importance of the educational system in perpetuating the 
popularity of French, even post-independence. According to Yasmine: 
  
  I do not really associate French with colonization. I associate it with school and  
  education. It is a question of generation. In my generation we used French a lot  
  because our schools were French schools…If I did associate French with   
  colonization, I would stop speaking so much French because I do not like that  
  idea. 
 
It is apparent that the language policies of the French administration influenced language habits, 
but Yasmine’s statement that she does not associate French with colonization is intriguing. 
Sonya also told me that, while French is a mark of colonization, she does not associate it with 
 subjugation. If French no longer carries these connotations what, then, can one deduce about 
choosing to speak French versus choosing to speak Arabic in post-colonial Tunisia? It is 
instructive to look further at the breakdown of Arabization in Tunisia. 
   Arabization in Tunisia never became the politically charged issue that it was in neighboring 
Algeria, which the French controlled from 1830 until a bloody independence was secured in 
1962. Several factors may be responsible for the relative lack of polarization in Tunisia. Algeria 
had to contend with a large Berber community fighting for their own language rights and thus 
had numerous contested identities to manage and appease.
xlii
 Tunisia, alternatively, had a 
relatively homogeneous population and had to negotiate only the path between Arabic and 
French, languages that had already been established as belonging to separate areas of life. The 
Tunisian leadership saw little conflict between a path of modernization shaped by French and the 
traditional societal values ingrained in Arabic.
xliii
 The earlier quote by the Tunisian Minister of 
Culture epitomizes this view. Under the second and current president, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, 
French continues to be the language of mobility and the number of students learning the 
language has increased since 1956.
xliv
 Humanities studies have gradually been Arabized at the 
secondary school level, but French remains the language of instruction for scientific and 
technical subjects, especially in higher education.
xlv
 
   The interview responses indicate that although French may not be explicitly associated with the 
actions of France, it still has ideational connections. On this issue, Sonya mused to me: ―Is 
French associated with modernity? I do not think so. But there is something true in what you 
said…There was this idea that if you did not speak French you were illiterate. This is no longer 
the case today. I do not think that anybody considers anybody who speaks Arabic only to be 
illiterate.‖ Sonya and Yasmine’s answers strongly suggest that their generation, at least, has 
internalized the motives of the colonial administration and view speaking French as an 
expression of a modern, sophisticated identity. Sonya insinuates that younger generations view 
Arabic relatively positively but the fact that the generation of the post-colonial political elite 
makes such associations is a possible explanation for why language planning policy has not 
durably sought to replace French with Arabic. 
   Of course, the women I spoke with are not only francophone, they also regularly speak Arabic. 
Code-switching indicates Arabic is still a part of everyday life, even for French speakers. To 
fully address the question about the prioritization of identity in the face of constraints, it is vital 
to look closer at code-switching and the perceptions of Arabic. Both Sonya and Yasmine 
expressed that they find it difficult to sustain conversations in Arabic, and often notice they 
switch to French. Yasmine articulated the frustrations that accompany navigating the two 
languages: 
 
 It bothers me. It is not attractive to change between the languages, although I do   
 it. I find it difficult to speak Arabic all the time. I have to think about how to say   
 some words in Arabic. This is for sophisticated things, if I am reasoning about   
 problems or politics. But if I am making plans with my sisters, I can say    
 everything in Arabic. 
 
Furthermore, both women emphasized that they are more comfortable speaking with other 
French speakers and find themselves more conscious about language when they speak with non-
francophone Arabs. 
    Together, the sentiments of Sonya and Yasmine illustrate the constraints Sen describes and 
their origins in political planning. Pierre Bourdieu writes about the manipulation of symbols by 
those in power, and it is evident that during their period of control the French manipulated 
perceptions of both French and Arabic to represent certain cultural associations. Educational 
practices ensured that these women used Arabic most in the private sphere. Furthermore, as 
Dobie discusses and Sonya and Yasmine demonstrate, multilingual situations create a 
hyperconsciousness about language choices. Notable is Sonya’s comment that even people who 
know Arabic tend to discuss politics in French. If this is true, it would imply that the superiority 
the French claimed through the equation of language with culture has to some extent been 
internalized. The historical dominance given to French by both the colonial and post-
independence administrations constrains choice on two levels. First, the Arabic vocabulary 
available to the women is limited. Second, because French is still associated with modernity and 
sophistication, the expectation may exist to be able to discuss certain matters in French. Sonya 
indicated that the superiority of French is less defined in younger generations but its continued 
status among her generation indicates the lasting strength of language planning in constraining 
language choices. Both women suggested to me that, as the French intended, the use of Arabic is 
still largely associated with more traditional aspects of life like the home and family. 
   Finally, it is intriguing that while the women expressed frustration about using the two 
languages, they did not indicate much tension or political polarization in the choices. As Bonnie 
Urciuoli suggests, the lack of tension may explain the habit of code-switching. Their frustrations, 
however, signal that there are still forces of identity at play. This is particularly palpable in the 
women’s acknowledgment of the colonial origins of French, its continued association with 
modernity, and their denial of its continued association with French ideology. Furthermore, the 
admission that they have trouble speaking completely in Arabic suggests that they prefer 
communicating with Tunisians who share similar educational and geographic upbringings, 
markers of specific social identities. The women may not feel the need to choose one language 
over another, but the feasibility of using each language has been limited. The women told me 
that they nevertheless view the coexistence of French and Arabic as a positive defining feature of 
Tunisian identity. Sonya said: ―We are aware in this country of the importance of learning 
languages…Even though French is the language of our colonizers, it is still a beautiful language 
and it is a language we appreciate.‖ The women suggested that their generation perceives the 
coexistence and simultaneous use of French and Arabic as definitive of the Tunisian identity. 
They presented themselves much like the state itself has, as facing a struggle between two 
ideational extremes and settling upon a middle ground, where languages and identities do not 
compete but work concurrently. Like the state, perhaps, the desire exists to be—and be perceived 
as—at once francophone and Arab. 
 
B. The Netherlands: Immigration and Social Cohesion  
 
Being yourself and at the same time being part of the society is a blessing for the 
 Netherlands. We are a multicultural society. Bonding is the first step towards social 
 cohesion. Facilitate both. 
Surrendra Santokhi, The Hague’s Program Office of Citizenship and Civic Participation 
 
The government of the Netherlands began to officially grapple with language and identity 
relatively recently. Consequently, a retrospective analysis is less appropriate here than in 
 Tunisia. The Civic Integration Examination took effect in 2006 and certain foreign nationals 
must complete it abroad before gaining entrance to the Netherlands. I contend that this event 
established speaking Dutch as a prerequisite for allegiance to Dutch society. The Netherlands 
study builds upon Tunisia’s experiences to illustrate how the current era of globalization 
intensifies identity questions. However, unlike in Tunisia where I addressed the research 
question through the eyes of those affected by the language policies, in the Netherlands I engage 
it through a governmental perspective. Together my two case studies explore both how language 
policies influence identity and how they are purposefully designed to produce such influence. 
   I first give an overview of immigration trends in the Netherlands, specifically the progression 
from ―Pillarization‖ policies to the current trends of multiculturalism and integration. Second is 
an assessment of the Civic Integration Examination. Finally, I hypothesize about the prospects 
for identity and language in the Netherlands. To accomplish this task, I use surveys conducted by 
Dutch researchers and an interview I conducted with Surrendra Santokhi, the senior manager of 
The Hague’s Program Office of Citizenship and Civic Participation.  
 
1. Dutch Immigration Trends 
 
First- and second-generation immigrants compose approximately ten percent of the Dutch 
population and in major cities this percentage climbs higher, reaching fifty percent in 
Amsterdam.
xlvi
 In contrast to current trends, the decade following the Second World War began 
with extensive Dutch emigration to other Western countries. Consequently, the Netherlands 
faced a labor shortage from the 1960s onward, and recruited workers from Morocco, Turkey, and 
the former Dutch colony of Suriname.
xlvii
 The Dutch government, thinking the shortage was 
temporary, focused on the development of parallel social institutions for each community in an 
effort to discourage permanent settlements.
xlviii
 This system was known as pillarization. Neither 
the Dutch nor the immigrants welcomed changes to their cultural identities, Phillip Muus argues 
in his study of Dutch immigration policies, and there were few calls for immigrants to adapt to 
Dutch cultural or linguistic norms.
xlix
 However, in the mid-1990s, immigrant populations 
appeared to be increasingly permanent and policies shifted focus to multiculturalism and 
integration, including a stronger emphasis on the Dutch language. Historically, the relations 
between the mainstream Dutch population and immigrant groups have been shaped by the 
degrees of similarity between them.
l
 Language became increasingly symbolic of similarity. 
   As the immigration flow increased, government policy became concerned with social cohesion. 
The demands for immigrants to adapt to Dutch norms and values grew concurrently with an 
effort to define what constitutes Dutch identity.
li
 Language has become a sign of loyalty to Dutch 
society. Dutch politics and media increasingly characterize an immigrant’s use of his or her non-
Dutch mother tongue as a hindrance to the cohesion of Dutch society.
lii
 A lack of Dutch language 
proficiency is therefore perceived as a lack of loyalty to the host society. Woolard and 
Schieffelin’s theory that a cross-cultural encounter increases the importance of language for a 
community applies here. The popularity of the late Dutch politician Pim Fortuyn, whose resolute 
anti-immigration views earned him one-third of the votes in the 2002 Rotterdam council 
elections, exemplifies the rising anti-immigration sentiment that accompanies calls to protect 
Dutch culture and language.
liii
 Much like French skills were necessary for successful social 
participation in colonial Tunisia, in the Netherlands language proficiency has similarly 
contributed to the economic success of the Surinamese relative to less fluent groups like the 
Turks and Moroccans.
liv
 However, the purpose of this essay is not to argue the practical 
 necessities of language proficiency, but rather the ways in which the Dutch government has used 
proficiency requirements to fuse and preserve language and identity. 
 
2. The Citizenship Test and Identity Preservation 
 
According to Floris Vermeulen, of the Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies at the 
University of Amsterdam, extensive integration of immigrants has failed partly because of the 
cultural distance that immigrants and native Dutch keep from each other, exemplified by 
separate, relatively homogenous neighborhoods and social spaces.
lv
 The changes to the 
citizenship test seek to better select immigrants receptive to and capable of integrating into the 
mainstream Dutch society by adding an exam about Dutch culture and another about Dutch 
language.
lvi
 The Dutch Department of Citizenship and Immigration states in its informational 
material: ―If you wish to acquire Dutch citizenship by means of naturalization, you must 
demonstrate that you have integrated sufficiently…You must be able to manage in Dutch 
society.‖lvii Defining integration into Dutch society as an active loyalty to the values and norms 
associated with Dutch identity as well as speaking Dutch expresses that loyalty. According to a 
2003 study by Hagendoorn, Veenman, and Vollebergh, the Dutch prefer immigrants with a high 
fluency and cultural match, a criteria including lifestyle choices like religion. Those with low 
fluency and little cultural match are least preferred, while close cultural match lessens the 
importance of fluency.
lviii
 A 2007 study by Hagendoorn and Sniderman similarly reports that 
one-tenth of Dutch respondents considered immigrant groups as inferior; Turkish and Moroccan 
immigrants were rated most inferior while the Surinamese were rated least inferior.
lix
 The 
relative acceptance of the Dutch-speaking Surinamese shows a correspondence between 
acceptance and language skills. Notably, the Civic Integration Examination does not apply to 
applicants from Western countries who arguably share values and norms similar to those of the 
Netherlands; applicants from the European Union, Norway, Iceland, Switzerland, Australia, 
Japan, Canada, New Zealand, South Korea and the United States are exempt.
lx
 Meanwhile, most 
current immigrants originate from non-Western countries. I interpret these exceptions as support 
for the idea that the Dutch government uses the citizenship exam, and the willingness to learn 
Dutch, to evaluate applicants’ openness to Dutch norms. 
   The language policy is a rallying point for nationalist campaigns. One of the most visible is 
Proud of the Netherlands (Trots op Nederland), founded by former immigration minister Rita 
Verdonk, the driving force behind the new requirements.
lxi
 When she launched her party in 2008, 
Verdonk made a strong statement in favor of a homogenous identity: ―When we Dutch people 
find ourselves constantly having to move over and adapt to new cultures in our own country I 
say: enough is enough!‖lxii Her support has been strong. In 2008, her party was projected to win 
22 of the 150 Dutch parliament seats in the next election, although the projection has since 
shrunk.
lxiii
 Based on anti-immigration trends, the Netherlands’ policies seem to enforce the 
understanding that speaking Dutch is a fundamental expression of loyalty to Dutch norms and 
values for immigrants. 
 
3. Choice, Language and Identity in the Netherlands 
 
Amartya Sen’s support for the freedom to prioritize identity is more difficult in the Dutch case 
than in the Tunisian case because immigrants effectively consent to the status of being Dutch by 
their applications for residency and citizenship. Considering the Dutch language majority and the 
 number of different languages immigrant groups bring, it would be pragmatically difficult for the 
Netherlands to function as a multilingual state. Furthermore, the state appears unwilling to see 
other languages as compatible with national identity. While Surrendra Santokhi expressed to me 
his admiration for the multiculturalism of the Netherlands, he also placed value on social 
cohesion and the role of language in providing it. Integration means immigrants assume the 
values and attitudes of the host population or the host population absorbs the attributes of the 
immigrant groups, according to Hagendoorn, Veenman, and Vollebergh.
lxiv
 The latter, they write, 
is less likely, although it was the case in Tunisia. Instead, the Netherlands uses language to 
protect traditional Dutch society—or the imagination of it—from significant infiltration by 
immigrant norms. The Civic Integration Examination is consistent with McNamara and 
Shohamy’s assertion that governments use such requirements to identify those willing to adapt. 
   Immigrants tend to be marginalized by mainstream society,
lxv
 but it should be further noted 
that immigrant communities do not form in isolation. This essay has shown that state policies 
hold the power to determine how immigrants identify themselves and how others view them. 
Santokhi underscored the salience of language as a condition for integration by recounting 
efforts by The Hague’s municipal government to reach immigrants who arrived before the new 
requirements were put into effect. The city encourages this group to attend non-compulsory 
language courses offered by foundations and religious institutions. The existence of this group 
indicates that despite recent measures there will still exist a portion of the population who may 
not linguistically integrate as much as new arrivals. Tonken, Hurenkamp, and Duyyendak 
caution that integration levels vary in other aspects too, as language integration can occur on a 
functional or emotive level.
lxvi
 The integration promoted by the government requirements is most 
easily classified as functional, or knowledge of Dutch that facilitates ―doing shopping, visiting 
the doctor [and] helping your kids with their homework,‖ in the words of Santokhi. 
Alternatively, emotive integration is more applicable to the Tunisian phenomenon of code-
switching, in which language ties effect a sense of belonging. Perhaps the Dutch requirements, 
then, are meant foremost to protect the mainstream Dutch identity rather than actively instill a 
sense of belonging in immigrants. Indeed, Vermeulen argues that there remains a strong 




   What meaning do these sentiments hold for the application of Sen’s theory to the Netherlands? 
The Civic Integration Examination evokes the ―illusion of singularity.‖ Of course, the sentiments 
of Santokhi reflect efforts towards multiculturalism, but the inquiry relevant to this research is 
the extent to which the language policies allow for the choice implicit in multiculturalism. 
Policies like the exam and the sentiments behind the popularity of movements like Proud of the 
Netherlands indicate that language has become symbolic of Dutch identity. Therefore, while 
multiculturalism may be encouraged from one direction, immigrants also face pressure to declare 
allegiance to Dutch society by speaking Dutch. The confrontation caused by immigration has 
created in the Dutch the hyperconsciousness Dobie references, much like colonialism did in 
Tunisia. Moreover, Vermeulen suggests immigrants feel disconnected from mainstream society. 
They may respond by staying within their own cultural groups. Is reciprocal alienation a caveat 
of Sen’s theory of choice and identity? The Dutch fear changes to national identity that could 
make them feel like foreigners within their native country, while immigrants face social 
exclusion without adequate Dutch language skills. They are at a crossroads similar to that which 
Tunisia faced when the instigation of French threatened to make Tunisians feel out of place in 
their own country. As discussed earlier, over time Tunisian society has found a way to integrate 
 both languages into a cohesive identity. Such a middle ground seems less likely for the 
Netherlands. Politically, the Dutch are using language as a symbol of Dutch identity. This 
phenomenon is becoming more important than the multicultural identity once attributed to the 
Netherlands. Therefore, immigrants face complicated choices and constraints in navigating 
identities in their new country. By seeking to live in the Netherlands and taking the required 
exam, they implicitly agree to make the Dutch identity a significant force in their lives. 
Consequently, the citizenship test constrains identity. However, perhaps these voluntary 
constraints are only temporary. My research suggests that some immigrants prioritize their home 
identity over the identity associated with their recipient country. The Civic Integration 
Examination, then, is meant to influence identity choices in favor of Dutch identity, but it may 




The tightening connections created by globalization present opportunities, but they also create 
tensions as individuals are confronted with norms and values that compel them to define their 
own identities. The cases presented here focus on different eras of globalization—colonialism by 
the West and immigration to the West—but both demonstrate how globalization urges an 
evaluation of identity and the role that language can play. Language, after all, facilitates sharing 
ideas and building a sense of community. I sought to discover how government language policies 
constrain the perceptions and expressions of identities, and Tunisia and the Netherlands present 
two responses encouraged by globalization. I find the Netherlands’ policies more constraining 
than those of Tunisia. The Tunisians I interviewed intimated that Arabic and French peacefully 
coexist in Tunisian society, although the languages are used for different purposes. The women 
saw both as characteristic of post-colonial Tunisian identity. The necessity of French for social 
mobility imposes some constraints, but these may have more to do with social class than 
identifying as Tunisian. Despite the apparent flexibility between French and Arabic, however, 
my research suggests that language still plays a crucial role. It seems too simplistic to dismiss the 
discrepancy between official policy and practice as an indication of linguistic ambivalence. 
Rather, this discrepancy may indicate, as do the class elements intimated by the interviews, that 
language policy in Tunisia may hold greater power in the social, rather than formal political, 
realm. 
   The Netherlands, alternatively, seems unlikely to approach a similar point of linguistic 
hybridization because language is more politicized at the moment in both the social and political 
realms. Dutch is the only majority language and thus speaking another language as one’s mother 
tongue or in daily interactions identifies one as an outsider. The Civic Integration Examination 
exemplifies these constraints and enforces them. The exam strives for social cohesion in theory, 
but it also perpetuates the perception that immigrant languages are a declaration of disloyalty to 
Dutch norms. The ―illusion of singularity‖ denounced by Sen is enforced. 
   While my research satisfies the initial inquiry, there are aspects of both cases that limit my 
analysis and warrant further investigation. Regarding the Tunisia research, the demographic 
status of the women I interviewed limits the applicability of my conclusions for the greater 
Tunisian population. Tunisians of different ages, socioeconomic backgrounds, and geographic 
origins may make different associations. Would French seem more foreign, for example, to 
someone outside the colonial centers or someone with less experience in the francophone higher 
education system? Considering the legacies of Arabization and the frustrations the women 
 expressed about exclusively speaking Arabic, it would also be valuable to explore how the 
factors that have shaped Tunisian identity (like the strong presence of French) influence the 
regional identity of Tunisians. 
   Concerning my research in the Netherlands, it is useful to look at the government’s 
perspective, but I can only speculate about the actual reactions to them. Interviews with 
immigrants would deepen my findings. Furthermore, I focus on immigrants arriving after 2007. 
What about second- and third-generation immigrants, who might identify as Dutch and speak 
Dutch fluently, along with their parent’s mother tongue? It would be interesting to see the extent 
of code-switching in the Netherlands. 
   Regardless of the newly surfaced questions, the research reveals an unanticipated and 
noteworthy occurrence. Although immigrating could be considered a more voluntary symptom 
of globalization than being colonized, in the context of my case studies, the former has created 
more tension. Undoubtedly the freedom to negotiate between French and Arabic in Tunisia 
partially results from the country’s particular history; as mentioned earlier, language is a more 
contentious subject in Algeria, which had a more aggrieved break from the French. However, the 
relative harmony between varied affiliations and languages also results from the government’s 
moderate language stance, exemplified by the Minister of Culture’s statement about the value of 
both languages. As the world faces ever-increasing interconnectedness, I find a thought from 
Sen’s Identity and Violence worthwhile: ―The hope of harmony in the contemporary world lies to 
a great extent in a clearer understanding of the pluralities of human identity, and in the 
appreciation that they cut across each other and work against a sharp separation along one single 
hardened line of impenetrable division.‖lxviii The Netherlands faces practical constraints against 
becoming a multilingual society like Tunisia because of the large Dutch-speaking majority. 
Nevertheless, as immigration and language debates gain momentum, it is constructive to keep in 
mind that the confinement of identities to simplified, singular expressions of allegiance may 




When I embarked on my year abroad, I wanted two things: adventure and answers. I found 
plenty of adventures, which challenged my thinking, intrigued my appetite, and established 
lasting connections. Answers were more elusive, and I wouldn’t have it any other way. My 
semesters in Tunisia and the Netherlands facilitated more academic inquiry than I could have 
hoped for, but more importantly, they showed me the exciting necessity of learning more. 
   I first turn to Macalester. I am grateful to Ahmed I. Samatar, Michael Monahan, the Institute 
for Global Citizenship, and the International Center for facilitating the ―Globalization in 
Comparative Perspective‖ program. Thanks also to Margaret Beegle for her support.  
   Next, I would like to thank those I met in Tunisia through the program run by the School for 
International Training. Thanks go to Mounir Khelifa for leadership; to Emna, Ale, and Hadhami 
for their advice and support; and to Saloua Cherif for her research advice. I am furthermore 
grateful to the women I interviewed. Our candid conversations were a highlight of my semester. 
I also have an immeasurable appreciation for my host mother, whose hospitality made my 
experience so memorable. Finally, thank you to the six other students on the program: we 
learned, we laughed, we drank a lot of mint tea, and Tunisia wouldn’t have been the same 
without you. 
    Turning to my semester in the Netherlands, I am thankful to Wiebe Nauta of Maastricht 
University for his constructive assistance with my research. I am also grateful to the staff of the 
Center for European Studies for all of their help, and especially to Nathalie Ummels, whose 
dedication was invaluable. Next, I thank Surrendra Santokhi of The Hague’s Program Office of 
Citizenship and Civic Participation for his perspective. 
   I was fortunate to share my semester in Maastricht with eight other Macalester students. The 
conversations and debates generated by your intelligence and enthusiasm fascinated me. You 
showed me that even a non-descript dinner table covered with our latest culinary efforts could be 
a hotbed for exploring global citizenship. 
   Lastly, I thank my parents. You have been generous enough to pass on not only your sense of 
humor, but your love of travel and the belief that a worldview should never be stagnant. Upon 
hearing your daughter declare her intent to travel the world for a year, you offered nothing but 
enthusiastic support and an avid interest in all the adventures along the way. For that, I am 
grateful. 
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